I've been asked to help moderate a forum where the age of the earth will be debated. This video was posted on the forum, and I listened to it yesterday while working. I want to respond to the video, but not in the forum, because I expect my response to be very long, and I'm not inclined to post a very long argument in that forum at this time.
In short, I disagree with some of his premises concerning falsification and justification or confirmation. I'll explain, but first, here's what I'm listening to while I write today:
Regarding falsification:
I believe that there is only one theory which is in all respects coherent with ultimately verifiable reality, and all other theories are falsifiable by reference to truths which are confirmed in ultimate. If a theory continually changes in order to adapt itself to observations about reality, then it will eventually be conformed entirely to reality and be true, even if that means it finally bears no resemblance to its initial form. So I don't believe that there is any such thing as a false unfalsifiable theory -- only that we might not immediately have the means to falsify a given theory at a given moment.
This does not mean that I'm willing to accept every theory which isn't as yet falsified, but only that I do not believe that theories can be rejected on the grounds that they are not falsifiable. He seems to acknowledge that unfalsifiable theories are not always invalid when he says, "if you have two theories and one is falsifiable and the other is not, you should probably be leaning toward the more falsifiable theory, other things being equal." However, I only agree with this statement insofar as it is relevant to a scenario where I have two ideas which are in all other things equal, except that one possesses a known means of falsification but the other doesn't, and I must immediately make a decision with irreversible consequences based on adherence to one or the other of those ideas. In the general course of things, if all other things are really equal except that one is falsifiable and the other isn't, then I think it's better to reserve judgement while pursuing (a) the known mode of falsification for the first theory, and (b) the discovery of a mode of falsification for the second.
Here comes the chorus: "But the existence of God is a plain example of something unfalsifiable!"
And, strictly on the notion that a "falsifiable thing" is "a thing for which, if it were really false, it could be disproved", I disagree. I don't even agree that it's unfalsifiable prior to our transition to the afterlife. I'm saying, the existence of God is falsifiable (on those terms) in this life, while we're alive. How? Well, step 1 is to develop a coherent epistemological framework which can function apart from God, so that we can then brainstorm a test which makes sense given that framework. And, why should you be curious about the nature of the test in step 2, when you don't even know what tools step 1 affords us to work with? How would you make sense of step 2 without step 1? In the meantime, if all our rational epistemological frameworks do depend on the existence of God, the question about falsifying him by means of a tool which depends on implicit affirmation of his existence puts us into a position where the very endeavor is in conflict with itself. No, step 1 has to be accomplished before proceeding to step 2.
Regarding justification or confirmation:
He suggest, on the grounds that YEC can survive scrutiny in light of any material evidence, and has not made any material or immediately observable (repeatable) predictions, that YEC is unfalsifiable, and so the strength of confirmation held by YEC is certainly weaker than the strength of confirmation held by ToE.
First of all, it's not true that YEC can survive scrutiny in light of any material evidence. Any observable example of evolution causing one kind of thing to become another kind of thing would do it (I acknowledge that's a frustrating proposal, since large scale evolution is said to take many lifetimes; nonetheless, it's not an uncommon proposal, and it meets the requested criteria for a mode of material falsification). For example, let's see groups of apes having children which are some kind of proto-men, and proto-men having children who are men. Let's see that line blurred, and nature effectually processing one kind to another, in real time, as opposed to inferring the event from fossils, which evidence, YEC maintains, is equivocal. If ToE is right, then we will someday see it, though it may not be in our lifetime. Likewise, ToE asks for things like (as mentioned in the above video) a rabbit or a bird deposited in some or another layer of sediment; perhaps it exists, perhaps not, and perhaps we won't find it in our lifetime -- the world is a big place, and I don't see how Haldane's rabbit is much better than something like Russel's Teapot -- both can be found, but neither is a repeatable test that we can just perform on a whim, and neither is necessarily going to be found in our lifetime.
Moreover, if Haldane's rabbit were found, (and for rhetorical purposes I am here about to engage in the kind of uncharitable speculation to which the above video is dedicated), I'm quite confident that ToE advocates would find a way to explain it without abandoning their commitments to ToE, as he does in the video while addressing and rebutting his selection of YEC arguments. Indeed, a major premise in the video, that people who are subject to the kind of self-delusion which he describes must rationalize the means by which dissenters are able to maintain their dissent, is exemplified by the subject matter of the video, which is to identify the means by which YEC people are able to maintain their dissent. I submit for your consideration: if two theories are held by a large number of people, how does it reflect on one of them to suggest that its dissenters depend on thought processes which are best described by comparison to mental illness, and therefore should not be heard in public, as is done in this video from about 44 minutes to the end?
Here's a proposal: given two conflicting presentations, all other things equal, if one of the presentations makes a major point out of suggesting that the other shouldn't be heard at all, it is precisely this presentation which should be held in lower regard.
But I'm digressing. Back on point:
He suggests that a theory which is able to make clear, precise, unexpected, and true predictions is strongly confirmed. I don't disagree, but I'm not aware of any such predictions made and confirmed by ToE, and I think (as he seems also to indicate) that this is not the only way to strongly confirm a theory. Where he goes wrong, then, is by indicating that YEC is not as strongly confirmed as ToE, only on the grounds that it lacks said predictions. YEC is strongly confirmed on other grounds: namely, it's as strongly confirmed as the Bible, and for the same reasons that the Bible is strongly confirmed. I've spent a lot of time going over arguments for the truth of the Christian faith at length in prior posts on this blog, so I won't do it right here in this post, (these arguments are long and take a lot of time to write out), but I might write out the current status of my argument in another post in the future. In short, the Bible's presentation of YEC is both clearer and more strongly confirmed than ToE, and the means of its confirmation are not the means by which ToE attempts to confirm itself -- it is strongly confirmed by means other than the means presented in the video.
So, I don't think it's a problem for YEC people to say, "it doesn't matter whether the answer to X is Y or Z, either way my theory will remain in tact"; because it isn't the case that YEC people are claiming to have epistemic certainty about the Y or Z of X, bur rather that they're identifying that X is not relevant to the particular mode of confirmation applicable to their theory, and so they are ready to adapt their understanding of X based on findings relevant to Y or Z.
I'm not a materialist or strict empiricist. I believe that epistemic certainty can come from rationalizations abstracted from material evidence, and that said non-empirically-obtained certainty can be strong enough to dictate adherence to a seemingly-less-likely interpretation concerning otherwise equivocal (explainable) material evidence.
Now, all that said...
I do believe that material falsification is a very good means to distinguish truth from falsehood. And so, I see some value to be gained from the practice of using a theory to make empirical predictions, and from inventing hypothetical scenarios by which the theory might be materially falsified. To that end, I've decided to dedicate some mental energy toward imagining ways to materially falsify YEC, and to imagining predictions that YEC might make. I'm frustrated that I'm not an established researcher in that field, and so I don't have all the tools at hand which I would like to have in order to help me come up with an informed prediction or hypothetical means of falsification, but I expect to be learning a lot more about it in the near future, and so I'm going to try and see what I can come up with. After all, what good am I if I don't work to contribute to the things I think are excellent?
"And that, I think, is the more dangerous aspect, really, to Young Earth Creationism. You're not just talking and teaching them ludicrous falsehoods; you're teaching them to think in ways that are twisted and are going to lead them down the garden path."
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