This is book report number 4 out of my planned 5 reports. Tomorrow is Saturday, so I will be attempting (for the first time!) a scheduled post. I'll write it today and set it to publish tomorrow, because having two long posts on the same day... well, I don't like it. It's for my sake, not yours. Consequently, however, I suppose the next post will have less commentary in advance of the report (unless I can think up something to write.... and as I say this, something has come to mind which I can share. A story! I will write it out if I have time, and I might not.) Book report number 5 is the one I am most proud of, though it might be the most difficult to follow.
Anyway, for today, I am thinking a lot lately about the cycle of encouragement, discouragement, and loneliness I experience as an "SGE" ("Lancastrian" now?) theonomist. I'm not trying to be all pitiful and stuff; I'm just introspecting. I've got emotions happening, guys! Emotions are happening! What else has my blog always been for except to elucidate my thoughts so that I can better understand myself?
So like, I noticed that I frequently cycle through feeling encouraged (when I see something validating God's law), discouraged (when I see someone who I thought might be interested fall away), and lonely (because I am the only man I live near, other than my son, who commits himself to God's law in this way, and I desire a community with which to obey God together).
Online friends can be very encouraging, but they also are volatile; people online change their perspectives often. And, the nearest thing to a stable community of SGE theonomists that I have found on discord (the only platform I frequent) is the Pronomian community -- but they are too heavily influenced by rabbinic commentary, and they're willing to basically skip-over important passages that don't fit their peculiarities. For example, I once asked a Pronomian what we would lose if we took our black sharpies and covered up Peter's vision of the unclean animals on the blanket in Acts. The answer was that we would lose insight into Peter's personality -- because, they don't believe we can learn from the vision, because if we learned from it, we might conclude that Jesus made all foods clean. And, since they are unwilling to accept that conclusion, they only permit themselves to learn from Peter's takeaway, which was that the gentiles have been made clean (this is necessary because they themselves are gentiles). However, ask them about the law, and they are willing to dive deep into speculative or symbolic applications. It's backwards to me.
Honestly, if I had to pick a next-door-neighbor, I don't know that I could easily choose between an evangellyfish and a pronomian. The pronomian loves God's law, which is extremely favorable, but they have the above hermeneutic which is frustrating and (IMO) dangerous to young learners. They have thought their perspective out thoroughly, and have decided on a hermeneutic which I believe is bad. To contrast, the evangellyfish neglects the law, but only because he has not thought through his perspective. He has no idea what he believes or what the Bible teaches outside the simple message of the gospel; all he needs is to be weaned off of children's-Bibles and fed some solid food, and his mind can be changed. He doesn't love God's law (yet), but he has the Holy Spirit writing God's law on his heart, and so he unwittingly does most of what is required of him already. In practice, the Evangellyfish might be more easily converted, and might cook better food -- bacon and shrimp are delicious.
Anyway, I have some pronomian friends, and so I don't want to be unduly harsh on them. They know I disagree, and should not be surprised at me telling why, even if they think my reasons are bad. If they feel I have misrepresented them, they know how to reach me. I'm happy to update what I've written in the unlikely event that any of them read this blog.
Anyway, here is the book report. There's some sarcasm in here, fyi:
Levering, Biblical Natural Law
The introduction to this book positions it to be very promising! Looks like I'll be focusing primarily on the first chapter:
> The chapter engages their work so as to explore three questions: whether there are biblical warrants for natural law doctrine, what kind of natural law doctrine biblical texts support, and what happens when natural law doctrine is left out of constructive ethics arising from the Bible. The chapter proposes that biblical revelation supports a theocentric and teleological understanding of natural law, and also that the oppositions that some find between natural law and the life of grace as well as between divine commandments and natural law are unwarranted.
And, that chapter leads in with a banger:
> But does natural law in fact have significant biblical warrants? Almost all recent studies of New Testament ethics—including the works by Richard B. Hays and Allen Verhey that I will discuss in this chapter—suggest, by avoiding the subject of natural law altogether, that the answer is ‘no’. ... the general neglect of natural law in New Testament studies arises both from the influence of Barth’s concerns and from ‘the widespread academic suspicion besetting any study of universal or “natural” law’ that has resulted from postmodern scepticism about our ability to discern, rather than construct, human nature. ... Recent work in Old Testament ethics, by contrast, exhibits a significant interest in natural law.
The New Testament scholarship he's read seems to agree that the NT doesn't support Natural Law. He attributes this to their tendency to "avoid the subject of natural law altogether" and to "postmodern skepticism". He finds more attention to the topic in Old Testament scholarship. This is surprising to me, since the passage in Romans 2 seems to be (based on frequency of use) the most critical passage for Christian NLT.
He frames the book as a means to overcome a few criticisms from Bockmuehl. Namely:
- Jesus's teachings about divorce are grounded "on the strength of a direct scriptural quotation (Gen 2:24). This is 'natural law' only in a highly contingent sense, if at all..."
- Romans 2:14-15 does not exemplify 'natural law' because it has the Torah in view.
- Jesus's teachings subject nature to God's commands, placing nature and law in opposition to one another.
I can get behind the first two, but I don't think I'd commit myself to the last one. He foreshadows his response by asking what counts as "natural" morality, and by suggesting that Bockmuehl hasn't made some necessary philosophical distinctions which, if he had, would undermine these criticisms. However, he approaches the matter with humility:
> The problems raised by Bockmuehl regarding the relationship of Scripture and ‘natural’ law and the relationship of nature and grace, the order of creation and the order of redemption, will recur throughout the present book. By the end of the book, I hope to have offered some initial answers, or at least promising paths toward answers.
Oddly, I didn't find any mention of Bockmuehl in the rest of the book, and I'm not convinced they were ever fully addressed. His main argument for the Biblicity of NLT is structured around his handlings of four philosophers: Hays, Verhey, Barton, and Novak.
Hays and Verhey are the New Testament scholars he chose as foils
= Hays =
Hays argues that the narrative particularities surrounding the commands in the Bible are necessary to understand the commands in terms of their systematic positivism -- that is, the commands are only positive laws, so they can be changed and adapted to new circumstances, but they must be understood in terms of their participation within a legal system adapted to ancient circumstances. Following on this, Hays says that, since the church is a new circumstance, we get new ethics. Consequently: he is ok with abortion.
> Hays finds that since ‘we have no command of the Lord’ (one might think of the commandment ‘You shall not kill’, but Hays is referring to Jesus Christ), the community may approve the abortion of infants in their mothers’ wombs in certain difficult cases. Hays states, ‘Surely if the New Testament writers could dare to formulate exceptions to Jesus’ explicit teaching against divorce, the church can also act—in fear and trembling under the guidance of the Spirit—to identify exceptions to the traditional prohibition of abortion.’ ... ‘[i]n a case where the New Testament offers us no clear instruction, it is perhaps inevitable that Christians will in good conscience reach different conclusions’.
Levering briefly critiques Hays by asking a few serious questions about abortion in particular, and then concludes:
> "That Hays does not, and given his approach perhaps cannot, ask these questions indicates serious deficiencies in his approach. Not only does the commandment ‘You shall not kill’ merit more attention (one notes that this commandment informs other areas of Hays’s ethical reflection), but also one finds that this commandment both requires and offers warrants for metaphysical reflection and correspondingly for natural law doctrine. In short, the ‘metaphorical paradigms’ offered by biblical stories read within the Christian community are insufficient outside this metaphysical questioning that arises from serious attention to the Old Testament theologies of law.
So, Hays is the model for Legal Positivism, and is set up as a foil for Natural Law. Since reading the OT statutes in terms of their immediate narrative context is insufficient to inform us about the underlying principles for the purposes of establishing a modern law-set, and the New Testament doesn't fully qualify what a modern application of those moral principles, perhaps Natural Law can step-in and help.
With that, he turns to Verhey.
= Verhey =
Verhey takes the emphasis on narrative to another level -- not content to say that the narratives should inform the meaning of the law in relation to the law's historical context, Verhey argues that the law is a strictly extrinsic directive, serving pedagogically to direct the historical people under the law into performing illustrative pedagogical actions unrelated to the literal verbiage of the law. Verhey then states that the actions of individuals under the law are templated examples of morality. From this point of view, Verhey is able to arbitrarily select details about the narratives and claim that these, not others, are the true moral intent of the scriptures.
The example Levering focuses on is Genesis and homosexual marriage.
> if the story forms a template, alternative stories may logically, even if not fully fitting the story, participate in the story. Human male–male and female–female monogamous sexual relations seem to participate in the creation-story, on this view, at least as regards the presence of monogamy.
Verhey takes the example of Adam and Eve, calls it a template for marriage, and then selects "monogamy" as the key indicator of morality in the story. Levering's response:
> Since he explores the ‘natural’ only as presented by the biblical story of creation (male and female, one flesh), he does not have resources for exploring further why homosexual actions, and homosexual unions, might not belong to human fulfilment ... Participation in the story is possible through monogamy, now separated from the bodiliness characteristic of the story.
Levering characteristically identifies natural law as the solution. He emphasizes "bodiliness" as a neglected component of the law, and explains:
> In response to Verhey, then, I would propose that to be understood, the biblical stories require metaphysical reflection upon the created order as a teleological order known by God: that is to say, natural law doctrine. Such reflection, it seems to me, would challenge both the separation of ‘monogamy’ and bodiliness, and the notion that human ‘personhood’ can be divided in terms of ‘homosexual’ and ‘heterosexual’.
If only Verhey had reflected on nature a little more, he might realize that he was missing out on this additional quality.
Notably, although he suggests reflecting on nature as his positive suggestion, a means to arrive at correct interpretations and avoid the errors of Verhey, nonetheless his negative arguments against Verhey's interpretations of various presented passages are grammatical:
> When Jesus deepens the commandment against adultery to include a warning against interior lust (Matt. 5:27–8), he is not displacing the commandment. When Jesus challenges the dietary laws by warning against ‘evil thoughts, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, slander’ (Matt. 15:19), he points to the Decalogue as the permanent and interior heart of the Law. When a young man asks Jesus what the man must do to have eternal life, Jesus places the ten commandments at the heart of following Jesus—adding a deeper story-context to the Decalogue, but by no means displacing or downgrading the Decalogue (Matt. 19:16–22).
Curious.
Now, the issue with Verhey brings up an important point about hermeneutics. The narrative is important to the story, but where does it stop? What details about a case law are legally/particularly relevant, and what details are generalizable? Levering's suggestion -- which he says he reached by reflecting on natural law -- seems not better than any other. Why, on the basis of nature, do our observations about Adam and Eve's bodiliness not factor as much as our observations about any other more restrictive feature which is unique to Adam and Eve, such as their parentlessness, or the time period in which they lived, or their position in the garden, or the absence of prior sin? Bodiliness seems to me as arbitrary as monogamy.
So far, for my part, I have not seen an instance of this question being raised where the details couldn't be resolved grammatically in view of the whole scripture. God endorses and commands marriages generally, and elsewhere commands against homosexuality. Biblical grammar generalizes one part, and particularizes another. So, thankfully, so far I haven't needed to consult with Aristotle to find answers to this kind of question.
= Barton =
Barton is next, and the first of Levering's two Old Testament scholars. He is read as an ally of NLT in principle, but one with a "highly problematic definition of what counts as natural law". Barton makes a few interesting claims:
- That Amos 1-2 includes denunciations of sins which are not mentioned in the law
- That the prophets, wisdom literature, and Jesus find in Genesis 1-2 the context for reading the whole Torah, including God's commandments.
- That the food laws are indeed concerned about what makes people sick -- a natural matter.
I'm looking at murder and kidnapping in Amos 1 and 2, and "because they rejected the law of Yahweh" in 2:4. I'm not sure what the second bullet means. I am certain that ceremonial cleanness, while it may be reflected in nature, is not strictly derived from nature. As far as I know, pigs didn't suddenly become "safe to eat" (medically) in the New Covenant Era.
The problems Levering points out in Barton's perspective, however, begins here:
> He does not, however, count the Ten Commandments as ‘natural law’. For him, they are strictly positive law, ‘which the people are to obey simply because they are given by God’, although their character as positive law belongs with the covenantal framework that renders such positive law less impersonal.
If the food laws were natural laws because they protected people from food borne illnesses, why isn't "thou shalt not murder" a natural law? Levering explains, it's because "thou shalt not murder" is commanded, and obedience is expected in virtue of the command, not in virtue of the natural matter described in the command. For Barton, positive law is the command, and natural law is "attuned to the particularity of the [B]iblical stories".
Barton "emphasizes that ‘the Old Testament takes it for granted that people pursue the good for the sake of an end’, a point that could lead to reflection upon natural inclinations", and he "recognizes that the Old Testament authors see God’s law as a blessing, and obedience as a form of gratitude.". Levering points out that this latter item conflicts with Barton's contrast between positive law and natural law, and suggests that on reflection, Barton might apply his insights more consistently to arrive at a more theocentric view of morality.
= David Novak =
Next is David Novak, who Levering does not directly critique in his section. Novak rejects the common teleological approach to NLT and proposes instead that NLT be discovered through a recognition of humanity's radical and extranatural uniqueness (the imago dei) as a limiting factor for what may be done in relation to mankind. His argument is that Natural Law Theory is Biblical in the sense that only the Bible can supply us with a definite account of that uniqueness, which is necessary for rightly understanding (discovering outside of scripture) our moral obligations.
= Levering's Proposal =
Finally, Levrering makes his argument in four points:
> First, Scripture presents certain goods as constitutive of true human flourishing and thus of moral order. ... In short, the early chapters of Genesis, within a profoundly theocentric context, reveal human beings to be intrinsically teleological, ordered to certain goods constitutive of a flourishing proper to human beings.
> Second, Scripture does not countenance an absolute disjunction between divine positive law and natural law. ... The divine commandments reveal what is in the people’s ‘mouth’ and ‘heart’.
> Third, the Bible’s understanding of law is theocentric. Law does not first pertain to ‘nature’ or to human ‘reason’. Indeed, law’s theocentricity overcomes this apparent opposition between ‘nature’ and ‘reason’ at its root, since law flows from the divine wisdom, Creator of nature and human reason.
> Fourth, the grace of the Holy Spirit does not negate, but rather fulfils, the law’s precepts.
And he concludes the chapter with a sort of victory lap:
> Evaluating the four approaches, I suggested that they provide, both deliberately and despite themselves, sufficient evidence of the biblical warrants and the interpretive value of natural law reflection. If so, the question cannot be whether Christian ethics must import an extrinsic system of natural law. Rather, Christian moral theology requires a philosophically sophisticated natural law doctrine in order to do justice to the teachings of divine revelation.
Space and time forbid giving a thoughtful response to chapters 2 and 3. Here are my one-sentence summaries:
Chapter 2 explains a historical shift from the O.G. pagan "theocentric" NLT to the modern "anthropocentric" NLT
Chapter 3 makes proposals for avenues of "enriching" Biblical studies by keeping NLT in the back of your mind while reading the Bible.
Suffice it to say, I didn't find what I was looking for in those, and they were very long.
= TLDR: =
Levering makes the case that the commands in scripture are best understood in proper consideration of NLT, basically arguing that natural law is Biblical strictly in the sense that Biblical morals are incoherent if you wrap the wrong definition of natural law around them. Then he demonstrates instead that Biblical grammar is the best motivator of a proper understanding of Biblical law, and in fact, all the troubles he mentioned are, to my knowledge, mediated by Biblical grammar without need for help from Aquinas. The foils he chose for his first chapter were weird. The first was presented as advocating subjective ethics, the next as arbitrary ethics, the next as contradictory ethics, and the last may not have been a foil. At any rate, I didn't exactly find a Biblical motivation for Natural Law theory in the sense that the Bible actually says things which should lead us to believe that humans are morally permitted to legislate.
