OK, I'm officially putting a ban on mask-complaining in my blog. Not gonna complain about it anymore (unless the rules at my work change in some new and more crazy way). I've purchased a breathable mask and I'm figuring out ways to fold it so that it gives me some fresh air and doesn't mess up the shape of my beard, while still hanging in front of my face-holes, so I think nobody will complain. (I might just cut the bottom half of the mask off later...). More, I'm not really concerned about giving a bad message to operators about how I feel on the matter, because I've got a big red badge hanging from my person all the time, which says that my company requires me to wear the mask. Nobody is gonna be confused about my position. I found out that some other people in my workplace, worse off than me, are not even allowed to remove their masks while sitting at their desk, because they're in a cube-farm; I'll still, for both our sakes, be working on a way to help them out, and I might update if any big breakthroughs occur on the stupid-policy front. 

Also, I recently read someone else's blog who complains in an even more melodramatic way than me. It was no comfort to me, but rather made me entirely more self-conscious about the kind of complaining I do here. I enjoy being a little melodramatic sometimes, because I enjoy a mild bit of prose, and prose is sometimes at its best when dramatic and hyperbolic. 

Speaking of prose, I've been letting myself wax a little more poetic in conversation with my wife recently, and she seems to really enjoy it. I suppose if I did it all the time, she wouldn't like it, but recently she's seemed to like it, and I am actually really glad that someone enjoys my prose.

...

TBH I don't have anything particular on my mind that I want to blog about this time.... I guess I'm just here to ramble because I'm stressed today.

Recently, someone I like has told me that my philosophy of science is "patchy, incomplete, and stultifying". I didn't engage in a thorough discussion to get them to explain the point to me, because, while I do want an explanation, my brain is tired these days, and I don't want the extended debate. So, in the short term, what I'm going to do is try to elucidate my philosophy of science for myself.

As usual for any given criticism, I guess, there are two possible ways for me to interpret the criticism:(a) they understand my philosophy of science, and so make a  warranted criticism; (b) they don't understand my philosophy of science, and so make an unwarranted criticism.

I'm not convinced of (a), because I don't think I've really explained my philosophy of science fully to them, and I also think that our usages of the word, "science" are so different that we quite talk past one another when attempting to compare systems.

However, I also agree with the criticism. I said that I want to try to elucidate my philosophy of science, because I do believe that my philosophy of science is incomplete and requires development. If I were to simply assert my understanding of empirical epistemics as I currently hold it, I would stultify myself.

But there's one major hurdle involved with the term "philosophy of science", which I so dislike that I'm tempted to abandon usage of the word "science" altogether, and demand that it is not used in future discussion with me about empirical epistemic warrants. That is, I seem often to hear people make a big deal about the notion that a particular view is or isn't science, when the designation actually would not change anything about the so-far-stated epistemic grounds for the view. It's as if calling an idea "science" gives it extra epistemic warrant, regardless of what actually prompted the idea, and calling something "not science" or "pseudoscience" is a great insult to the thing. This would make sense if all scientific ideas shared equal epistemic warrant, but they don't, and in fact, as far as I can tell, there exist within the set of things undisputedly called "science" several areas where pools of nominally scientific ideas exist with the expectation that all but one of them will eventually fail. So, the designation, "scientific", really only seems to denote that an idea has sufficient empirical weight to be worthy of critical attention -- this bar seems to me much lower than the way most people treat the word, "science", and I'm not sure that this bar is even high enough to make the term "science" useful in a debate about any given idea. If the idea were not scientific on these terms, then it seems the debate is a waste of time for the negative.

I know that the issue is more complicated than what I've presented above. I've recently read a few articles, and listened to a few lectures, from (afaict) reputable secular resources on what makes a theory "scientific". I'll here proceed to comment on the presentation by Forbes, because it seems concise enough. Here's my summary (including paraphrases and additional notes, per my understanding) of the list:

Forbes says a scientific idea is/has...

• Plausible (Consistent with other things we know to be true)
• Unique (Why is this on the list? If it's the same as another idea, then it is the other idea, and the other idea and this one should be evaluated together on all of the other terms.)
• Power (The idea not only describes something which can coexist in a consistent manner with what we know to be true, but it causes or explains some of the things which we observe.)
• Simplicity (The idea isn't too Rube-Goldberg to be more plausible than other simpler ideas. I don't think this is a realistic epistemic criteria, except inasmuch as several simultaneous unrelated specific causes are generally less likely than a single specific cause happening without the others, or than several related simultaneous specific causes. What I'm saying is that I think this is subjective and should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis; I don't think it's worth its own bullet point, unless we want to change the bullet to "probable" instead of "simple", but then I think that plausibility occurs on a gradient which includes assessments of probability, making "simplicity/probability" a redundant criterion at best.)
• Testability (or falsifiability, by means of a test which can potentially be executed with existing technologies. This one I agree with, on a somewhat qualified understanding of the clause, "can be potentially executed with existing technologies")

A scientific idea graduates to being a "framework", when its consequences have been worked out to the extent that several conceivable tests can be conducted to falsify it. A scientific framework graduates to being a "theory" when several such tests have been performed and it has withstood them unfalsified.

I think my ideas about testability and falsifiability might make the average science enjoyers uncomfortable -- less so, perhaps, if they took the time to understand the aim of my Feb 16, 2022 post, but even after that -- they might argue that I've broadened the scope of falsifiability outside the boundaries of practical usefulness, but I don't agree, because I think that the qualifier "executed with existing technologies" ignores several valid avenues for falsification, e.g. a rational proof. (To boot, I don't think that the criteria of falsifiability, without my qualifiers, is applied consistently to the established scientific theories.) And I don't think that rationalizations should be given lower epistemic warrant simply by virtue of their being abstracted from empirical observation, so if we limit "science" to empirical matters, then I don't believe that the designator, ("science"), has any bearing at all on the actual epistemic warrant associated with an idea, except where ideas which involve zero rationalization are concerned (of which there are none). So, when I read someone calling an idea (X) "non-scientific" because its potential for immediate empirical falsification is lower than the popular scientific threshold, with intent to devalue the epistemic warrant for X, I can't help but think they're ignoring the bulk of available faculties by which epistemic warrant can be garnered, and they're simultaneously invalidating all of science, because science ultimately has its roots in rational calculations which are needed to justify the potential for empirical assessments before empirical observation can even be conducted.

But the issue which appears to come up most often with respect to my philosophy of science is not that it lacks conformity with the requirement for falsification, power, plausibility, &c.. It's more like I reject the epistemic weights assigned to certain kinds of (so called) empirical tests. In particular, what keeps coming up is my disagreement with the notion that we can view a piece of evidence, devise an explanation for what processes caused that evidence to become its current condition, and then treat the evidence itself as the result of a past unobserved experiment consisting of the processes thus explained (i.e. my take on much of the OE and evolutionary evidence). 

Now, I allow for inferences concerning unobserved or unobservable objects/processes where tests can be performed to (indirectly) demonstrate the existence of said objects/processes. However, given two explanations for how a piece of evidence can acquire some property, (e.g. a rock charring black by smoke or heat from two possible sources), all other things being basically the same, I don't think that we can say that the evidence suggests one or the other of them. And, given only one available explanation (X) for a given phenomena, we still cannot say that the evidence is making a positive assertion for X, but only that the evidence positively asserts the phenomena itself, or else, supposing another source of information (P) asserts, "it wasn't X", or generally contradicts X by its own properties; if the information from P has sufficiently greater epistemic warrant than the explanation X, then I believe it is ok to say, "I don't know what the explanation is, but I am confident that it wasn't X".

So, briefly applying this to the discussion which I believe prompted this criticism.... The other said that the fossil record (in particular the arrangement of complexities in the geological layers) entails or asserts evolution. I am no expert, but I am willing to grant that a progression can be seen in the complexity of organisms in the layers of earth, or even that said progression involves particular qualities being gained and lost in an orderly fashion from bottom to top. I do not believe that the evidence makes any assertions about the reason for this progression, its cause or origins, but only that the fossils are thus and thus. I am not aware of any observable or repeatable tests actually performed to demonstrate the evolutionary hypothesis concerning the fossils as they are, (evolution from kind to kind, I mean), and I'm under the impression that such a demonstration would take longer than my lifetime. The other party said that the evidence can be seen as a series of unobserved past tests confirming the hypothesis -- without meaning to be uncharitable (I don't mean to attack my interlocutor, since I admitted at the beginning of this post that we haven't worked out an understanding of one another's ideas at length), I am not sure how this isn't question-begging. 

I simply don't see the epistemic warrant for the evolutionary hypothesis; maybe one could say it's because I'm uninformed about the evidence, but I literally have the evidence shoved in my face from all angles all the time -- assertions concerning the age of the earth and the evidence for those assertions are on TV, at the zoo, at the aquarium, in every movie, in books, on YouTube, in my discussions with people online, in debates that I watch on the topic, in articles in science magazines or journals, in lectures (I do actively search out lectures on the topic to help myself better understand the opposing position), I get it from Christians and atheists alike, and I haven't seen anything warranting the degree of confidence espoused by the advocates of this position. It seems like everyone just assumes the idea and builds on it, saying that every stone placed on that foundation is additional support for the foundation itself. I feel like there has been a lot of opportunity to show me the evidence, and I'm genuinely seeking it out, but it's just not there. I'd suggest me getting a PhD on the topic so that I could become informed and gain the epistemic certainty that those around me have, but those who so strongly espouse evolution are not PhDs themselves -- where did they get all this certainty?

What I do have available to me, however, is a source with such high epistemic warrant that it easily overrules all of the above hypotheses or explanations of the evidence resulting in evolution with common origin -- a P who asserts, "it wasn't X" -- and that is the Bible. I recognize that there are several allegorical options for interpretation of the Genesis, but it seems to me that these require very unnatural readings of the text, and their weirdness evidences their dependence on motivated reasoning. I really don't see a way around it. People say, "chiasm evidences allegory", but there's chiasm in the whole Bible -- the Mosaic sacrifices to the Messianic sacrifice -- and nobody serious argues for an allegorical Moses and an allegorical Jesus. People say, "if you accept YEC then you must also accept a literal dome over the earth", but the Bible elsewhere rather plainly contradicts a literal dome over the earth (by describing the firmament/heavens in terms which don't permit firmness), whereas it doesn't do that to a historical Adam, so, just based on usage and references from other places in scripture, if we allow that the whole of scripture has a single-author with unanimous intent, there's a clear categorical difference in the way that the single word "firmament" should be interpreted over against the entire first 9 chapters of Genesis.

"But I live out in the Styx so I have to worry about coyotes."

 Listening to Mr. Hopkins today while I write and work; he really knows how to brighten things up.

Today someone at work asked me if I'm ok. I said, yeah, in an upbeat enough way, I think, and they asked again, "are you sure?". I took a step back, expecting some sarcasm about a piece of broken equipment, and said, "is something wrong?", and they diffused the conversation with a comment about how things often break in this factory. It made me wonder if my negative feelings have become apparent externally.

Really though, this mask thing is getting me down. My head keeps circling on the issue, trying to adopt a charitable answer to the question, "Why would my company leadership, after so long justifying their position on masks by deference to the CDC, now ignore the CDC's position in favor of maintaining these kinds of restrictions -- rules which cause discomfort and draw an outward and unprofitable distinction in cleanness between employees?" And, I find myself often frustrated by how the current policy explicitly declares about itself that it does not reveal anyone's medical information, making it only a very thinly veiled policy of actually revealing everyone's medical information. I try to imagine that they're legitimately concerned about people's safety -- as the safety manager told me, "we are responsible to produce a safe working environment, and if someone unvaccinated were unmasked, it would be an unsafe environment". But neither the CDC nor OSHA hold that position, and so the determination about what is an "unsafe environment" comes not from the research itself (which I presented before), nor from the organizations responsible for publicizing the research itself and suggesting policy (the CDC and OSHA). It is a purely subjective and unsupported ruling on what makes people safe or unsafe. This means that there is someone in the higher-ups who is more worried about COVID than "the science" itself. Given the information we have about COVID, I really have a hard time grasping how someone can rationally maintain that kind of fear, and an even less reasonable thought seems to roll around in my mind -- that the policy of covering the faces of unvaccinated people, and making them wear a badge indicating it, is to shame unvaccinated individuals into vaccinating themselves. 

Which is more charitable, to suppose that the company leadership is irrational or that they are ruthless?

The above question, which finds itself at the front of my mind daily, whenever I don the uncomfortable veil, is drawing me toward a place where I may decide that, while I like my boss and most of my coworkers, I don't like my company. And, to prevent my accessing that place, (I prefer to like my workplace), I have been trying to think of an effective means of protest -- something that will make my point without causing any trouble. I haven't thought of anything yet, but that's where my mind is these days. 

But when I'm not thinking of that, the instructive work I'm making for my son has been often in my thoughts. I think I've figured out how I can organize it without putting too much priority on empiricism, nor neglecting the ease-of-access which empiricism offers. I'll start the manual by explaining good hermeneutics, and I'll make literature and epistemics into subchapters within the hermeneutic discussion. In fact, hermeneutics will be the primary thrust of the whole manual, and all other topics will be extensions and applications of the hermeneutic approach -- I think this is fitting and natural, since scripture itself says that it is effective for instruction, to equip the man of God for every good work. And so, it seems that hermeneutics, (which are really just basic, common-sense linguistic tools, and applications of scripture to itself), form the first conscious basis for all other inquiry, including inquiry into the question of how that hermeneutic itself is justified. And so, hermeneutics must produce epistemics, and epistemics must produce hermeneutics. The matter can be worked in either direction, but God has not instructed us to develop epistemics on our own in order to reach toward scripture, by a rout other than direct reference to scripture; no, the approach most consistent with my position, and most obedient to God's word, and most deferential to God's own preeminence and glory, is to go first to the scripture, and from it learn how we are enabled by God to trust our senses enough to know that the answers we've obtained from scripture are true in absolute. And so, step 1 is hermeneutics, which requires only the faculty which God affords singularly to humans -- that is, the complexity of our ability to communicate. The ability to read isn't a prerequisite for hermeneutics, but "how can they believe if they have not heard?" -- reading is just another way to hear. So hermeneutics doesn't depend on literacy, but literacy is very beneficial because it enables us to "hear" from a host of voiceless sources, and lends itself to the same epistemic answers concerning trust for our senses &c..

"You'll have a home with me, just as long as there is a day."

A lot going on right now.

We gave our dog to my sister and her family, who in a few days will tell me if they want to keep him or give him back. There aren't any apartments near my work that allow dogs, and he'll have a better life at her house anyway. He'll have more space to run, and Ray's personality is ideal for maximizing his training potential -- a thing I regret not doing. The dog is very well behaved and relatively well trained, and generally very smart and eager to please anyway. I am confident they'll keep him.

I got the promotion I've been working for. I am glad for it, and proud of the title, but I guess it's like having a birthday -- I don't feel any different, and I suppose, for some reason, I thought I would. I think it's a consequence of all the hype and pressure that's been on me related to this promotion. Anyway, I'm glad to have it behind me.

The mask mandates have been lifted by the CDC, but not at my company. So now, my company can't use the excuse that they're sticking to CDC guidelines anymore -- it was never about the CDC to begin with. Now, they say that there is some potential liability if they remove the mask mandates and someone gets sick. I would be surprised if that were true, as I suspect it's more that corporate doesn't want to flip flop so quickly on such a controversial policy as the red badges, when they had to argue so often to get them implemented. People with a red badge still have to wear masks, and I'm one of a very small minority around the office who do so (I'm led to believe the proportion is greater elsewhere, and that many who wear green badges were openly opposed to the policy as well). Nonetheless, as I predicted before, I feel sometimes like a leper. The irony of the matter is not lost on me -- I was most vocally opposed to the masks, and now at my many unproductive meetings I am the only one hiding my face. It makes the meetings all the more loathsome to me.

To cope with the meetings, therefore, I'm bringing a pocket notebook to them hereafter, where I'll be practicing my shorthand. It's a way for me to not pay any attention to what's going on around me, while seeming to be making diligent notes. And, with any luck, I'll become a quick stenographer in no time.

I've noticed that my general tiredness, coupled with these frequent unpleasantries, is affecting my disposition in general. I've been a little more grouchy in my interactions on the forum and at home, and less able to comprehend complex arguments. I dislike that. I hope that my awareness of it will enable me to counteract it.

In the evolution forum, I noticed that I get anxious while debating the topic. I'm consciously trying to be open minded to the possibility that I'm anxious because deep down I know I'm wrong, but I can't shake the thought that the real reason is: whenever anyone tries to summarize anything about evolution, the pro-evolution participants accuse them of being uninformed because their summary wasn't complete or precise enough. And, when the correction comes in, it isn't so much an actual correction as it is a demand that language be used which denotes a factual relationship between the evidence and the Darwinian conclusions. So, it's impossible to have a detached conversation about the evidence, where we examine, "what could it mean?" because all descriptions of the evidence must promote evolution. For example, rather than saying "a differences are seen in the fossil record through layers of earth", we must say, "a progression is seen in the fossil record through time". And, rather than saying, "dinosaurs became chickens", we must undergo some kind of more lengthy or precise explanation of the many years during which intermediate species lived and died between the end of the dinosaur and the advent of the chicken (or whatever). These trifles extend the discussion and endlessly distract from whatever point the YEC person might be trying to make. And, if we persistently abstain from describing the fossil record as containing such a progression, or if we persistently summarize the years of evolutionary progress for the sake of time, we are called intellectually dishonest. Moreover, the YEC position is explicitly described as being intellectually catastrophic prior to any discussion about it. 

What am I to do? It appears to me that here, like everywhere else, there is a bent standard for literary precision and intellectual openness. I worry that this forum is not so different from others on the same topic, except that it's run by Christians. I think the only way to survive in it will be to forcibly engage in some really excruciating conversations about epistemic methods, and if arguing with atheists has taught me anything, it's that conversations contrasting basic epistemic assumptions are long and terrible.

I've been working on Isaac's enchiridion here and there as I get time. The hardest part is organizing the information I want to present. Right now, I'm thinking I will start by laying out some basic principles of communication (argument and literature), then hermeneutics (which depends on argument and literature), and then show how those hermeneutic rules can be used to interpret scripture to build a foundation for knowledge at length, all without mentioning any counterpoints or debated topics. Major questions in my mind include whether I can explain all that without contrasting the information against mistakes by digressing into a debated topic, and whether it's best to just go ahead and start with epistemics, and then build knowledge from the ground up, leading subsequently into communication and showing the sort of circular relationship between all of this and hermeneutics by way of "building the house from the ground up". Does the structure and organization of the book implicitly communicate a hierarchy of knowledge, and so would I be accidentally prioritizing empiricism if I teach from the conscious and observable to the subconscious and rational, rather than the other way around?

In any case, at the end of the section on epistemics, I'll summarize all the prior sections with several points in the form of a "toolbox". Then I'll get into all of the various debate topics which (I perceive) have been argued and resolved over and over for the past 6000 years, and explain how these epistemic tools make them readily answerable, in hopes that he'll not be like many others in history, who for lack of knowledge waste their years rehashing the same tired debates. I'll give a basic overview of the material so that he'll have enough to build on without needing to go and read all of Kant and Hume, in hopes that he won't be like someone who thinks himself smart only on account of his ability to regurgitate theories of long-dead people, but rather that he'll build on those theories himself -- a contributor to knowledge, rather than just a perpetuator of knowledge. And finally, I'll apply the same tools to many practical day-to-day issues, in hopes that he'll see how a right knowledge of God and a Christian epistemology is relevant to every decision, and every area of life, even the areas which we compute without explicitly mentioning God, including mathematics and every area of science.

"Yes, unfortunately we all have to pay them"